Mike Chapman NZKGI Chief Executive

I think the three most serious biosecurity risks today are (in order of priority): seaports, fruit fly from Australia, and international airports.

There is a lot of fuzzy thinking about biosecurity risks. Often what is stated to be a risk is one driven by the media or the politicians. What we need to carefully assess and deal with is the real biosecurity risks.
Airports are a good example of fuzzy thinking. This is because we all travel through international airports and discuss how poor the biosecurity measures are at these airports. The media and the politicians also focus on international airports. About five million passengers arrive each year at our international airports.
It is pleasing to note the Ministry for Primary Industries is managing biosecurity risks through airports by improving the controls. The ministry conducts annual surveys to assess how effective they are. This involves re-checking passengers once they have already been through the biosecurity controls at the airport. This year's survey, conducted in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, involved checking some 6800 passengers to see if they were carrying goods that pose a biosecurity risk after passing through airport checks. The survey showed 98.8 per cent of passengers who had been through checks were not carrying medium or high-risk goods, including materials that may host fruit fly or serious animal diseases. The overall compliance result for all risk goods was 96.9 per cent. MPI's target is 98.5 per cent. Last year's result was 95.3 per cent. The ministry has advised the shortfall was mostly due to low-risk items like used equipment, such as footwear contaminated with blades of grass getting past border checks. This is nothing serious in terms of real biosecurity risks.
Other international airport initiatives include:
• The recruitment of 32 new quarantine inspectors in August.
• The introduction of 11 new x-rays machines from October with 3D technology.
• Six new dog teams in place by the end of the year.
• Passenger-profiling so travellers who present the most risk, get the most comprehensive biosecurity checks.
My view is the ministry is doing what is required at international airports. Airports will always be a major risk; and constant vigilance and improved biosecurity are always required.
But when it comes to seaports, it is a different story. The seaport figures are:
• 660,000 containers are imported each year with the rate of biosecurity inspection of containers as low as 1 per cent. The ministry has an initiative to increase the level of inspection and this is fully supported by industry. It is assessed that 90 per cent of the containers do not present a risk.
• Most of the containers are transported away from the seaport and inspected at one of 5500 biosecurity licensed transition facilities. But inspection is not by ministry staff, but by the employees of the importer.
• During the cruise season 250,000 passengers will pass through the Port of Tauranga arriving on more than 90 cruise ships. By way of contrast, Rotorua International airport only has a maximum 360 passengers a week. Admittedly, for all but a small number of these ships Tauranga will not be their first port of call.
The problem is there is no annual survey done about how effective the biosecurity measures are at the seaports. The ministry is working to develop a way to measure this. My view it is very timely for the biosecurity measures at the seaports to be dramatically increased. Inspecting only 1 per cent of containers is not a sufficient measure protecting our primary industries.
Now add to this the increasing fruit fly risk from Australia. A fruit fly incursion would stop many horticultural exports; and for kiwifruit it is estimated this would cost the Bay of Plenty (based on 2008 figures) the loss of more than 3400 jobs and $820 million in lost earnings.
So what's happening in Australia:
• The Riverina and Shepparton Irrigation Areas, where a lot of New Zealand fruit and vegetable imports come from, will no longer be managed according to the Fruit Fly Control Code of Practice. In other words there will be no fruit fly controls in place and eradication actions taken.
• The removal of the movement restrictions on Queensland fruit fly host material across states, with the exception of the Greater Sunraysia pest-free area.
These changes came into effect on July 1, 2013.
The result is the chance of a fruit fly incursion in New Zealand has just dramatically increased and, when this is added to the level of biosecurity at our seaports, this is a real and present danger.
Kiwifruit Vine Health has asked for an urgent review by the ministry of the Australian fruit fly risk. This is critical. As an industry, we will continue to push for better biosecurity where there are real risks that require action. I ask that you write to your Member of Parliament asking for action.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily the views of NZ Kiwifruit Growers Inc or Kiwifruit Vine Health (KVH). The author is a Director of KVH. KVH was set up by the kiwifruit industry to manage the industry's response to Psa and other biosecurity threats and incursions. Its members are kiwifruit growers through NZ Kiwifruit Growers Inc, the post-harvest operators, Zespri and Turners and Growers.